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Abstract:	This	paper	uses	the	universe	of	convictions	occurred	in	France	between	2000	and	
2003	 to	 document	 the	 gender	 gap	 in	 criminal	 justice.	 First,	 during	 this	 period,	 and	 after	
controlling	 for	 very	 precise	 description	 of	 the	 offenses	 as	 well	 as	 other	 observable	
characteristics,	 women	 get	 prison	 sentences	 15	 days	 shorter	 than	 men	 on	 average.	 This	
represents	 a	 33%	decrease	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	 average	 prison	 length	 in	 the	 sample	 (44	
days).	Second,	this	gender	gap	is	also	observed	within	pairs	of	criminals,	each	consisting	of	
one	man	and	one	woman,	who	are	convicted	together,	on	the	same	day,	by	the	same	person	
and	for	the	same	crime.	Lastly,	 this	paper	present	robust	evidences	that	the	gender	gap	 is	
affected	 by	 the	 judges'	 gender	 but	 not	 the	 prosecutors'	 gender.	 Using	 the	 evolution	 of	
courts'	 composition	 between	 2000	 and	 2003,	 results	 show	 that	 a	 one-standard-deviation	
increase	in	the	number	of	women	in	the	court	decreases	the	gender	gap	by	10%.	
	
	
	
	
	
	 1.	Introduction	
	
	
Does	 the	 judicial	 system	 treat	women	and	men	equally?	Gender	has	been	proved	 to	be	a	
support	 for	 extensive	 discrimination	 in	 different	 social	 mechanisms,	 including	 grading	 at	
school	and	firm	promotion.	Biases	are	mainly	to	the	disadvantage	of	women.	The	treatment	
of	 the	 sexes	 by	 the	 judicial	 system	 seems	 to	 differ	 from	 the	 prior	 observations.	Men	 are	
more	likely	to	be	arrested	by	the	police	and	then	to	be	sent	to	court.	Their	sentences	are,	on	
average,	of	a	longer	duration.	Those	facts	tend	to	characterize	a	bias	against	men.	This	rapid	
conclusion	 is	 coherent	with	 the	 standard	 gender	 stereotypes	 that	 present	males	 as	more	
violent	and	risk-takers	and	women	as	more	gentle	and	risk-averse.	However,	this	apparent	
heterogeneity	could	simply	be	derived	 from	differences	among	criminal	behaviors	and	not	
from	disparities	in	judicial	treatment	of	gender.	In	this	paper,	I	use	several	methodologies	to	
investigate	this	question	in	the	French	context.		
	
In	2010,	 in	France,	women	represented	10.5%	of	convicted	persons	 for	 the	most	common	
criminal	 category2	(i.e.	 excluding	 the	 most	 severe	 crimes	 like	 murder	 or	 rape	 which	 are																																																									
1	I	would	like	to	thank	the	French	Ministry	of	justice	(Sous	direction	de	la	Statistique	et	des	Etudes)	and	
especially	Benjamin	Camus	for	having	helped	me	to	obtain	and	interpret	the	data.	I	am	especially	grateful	to	
Roberto	Galbiati	and	Aurélie	Ouss	for	comments	on	earlier	drafts.	Support	throught	ANR	Labex	is	gratefully	
acknowledge.	
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judged	 by	 specific	 courts).	 Overall,	 40%	 of	 women	 were	 sentenced	 to	 a	 non-monetary	
sanction	(e.g.,	probation,	prison,	suspended	prison),	and	8.5%	were	sentenced	to	prison.	The	
same	year,	47%	of	male	offenders	were	sentenced	to	non-monetary	sanctions	and	19.9%	to	
prison.	The	gender	gap	is	also	observed	–	while	attenuated	–	before	judgment.	According	to	
the	French	Ministry	of	 justice,	women	represent	18%	of	the	defendant	but	only	10.5%	are	
sued	 (Büsch	 et	 al	 2016).	 This	 gender	 gap	 is	 not	 specific	 to	 France.	 Female	 prisoners	 are	
slightly	more	numerous	in	the	USA	(8.8%	of	all	prisoners)	than	in	France	(approximately	3.5%	
of	all	prisoners),	but	they	are	still	largely	“under-represented”.	According	to	the	world	prison	
brief3,	women	represent	between	2	and	9%	of	the	prison	population	in	all	countries.	
	
This	gender	gap	in	conviction	and	sentencing	could	be	related	to	another	important	gender	
gap	 within	 police	 and	 judicial	 administration.	 Indeed,	 the	 regalian	 power	 of	 the	 state	 is	
traditionally	devoted	to	men.	 In	both	England	and	France,	women	represent	between	20%	
and	30%	of	the	police	forces4.	Among	judges,	women	represent	only	25%	of	the	workforce	in	
England	and	25%	of	the	federal	 judges	 in	the	US5.	The	situation	 is	much	more	balanced	 in	
France,	where	women	are	more	numerous	than	men.	However,	this	evolution	is	recent	(the	
profession	was	only	opened	 to	women	 in	1946),	and	women	are	still	underrepresented	 in	
high-ranking	positions.	This	gap	could	be	partly	responsible	for	the	differences	in	conviction	
probability	and	sentences	between	men	and	women.	 Indeed,	men	and	women	have	been	
shown	 to	 judge	differently	 in	 some	 specific	 cases	 (e.g.,	 Fischer	 1997,	Boyd	Epstein	Martin	
2009),	and	they	probably	react	differently	to	defendants’	characteristics.	
	
In	 this	 paper,	 I	 first	 quantify	 and	 then	 try	 to	 understand	 the	 origins	 of	 the	 gender	 gap	 in	
sentencing.	 I	 rely	 on	 two	 different	 administrative	 datasets	 from	 the	 French	 Ministry	 of	
Justice.	The	first	one	contains	all	convictions	for	crime	in	France	from	2000	to	2003.	For	each	
conviction,	 the	 dataset	 contains	 precise	 information	 on	 crime	 type	 –	 a	 1400-cell	
nomenclature	that	 in	turn	contains	all	possible	cases	provided	for	by	the	 law	–,	sentences,	
criminal	 record,	 dates,	 place,	 procedural	 mechanisms	 and	 some	 socio-demographic	
variables:	age,	sex	and	nationality.	The	second	dataset	gives	the	gender	composition	of	the	
175	 first	 instances	 of	 criminal	 court	 proceedings	 in	 France	 both	 in	 2000	 and	 in	 2003.	
Unfortunately,	the	data	are	not	available	for	the	two	years	in	between.	Both	the	judges’	and	
prosecutors’	genders	are	available.	
	
Using	the	datasets,	I	first	document	the	gender	gap	in	sentences	over	the	period.	While	the	
average	prison	sentence	for	men	is	47	days,	women	get,	on	average,	19	days.	They	also	get	
shorter	probation	time	and	longer	suspended	prison	time.	Even	after	controlling	for	all	the																																																																																																																																																																														
2	Those	statistics	come	from	the	«	Annuaire	statistique	de	la	justice	».	http://www.justice.gouv.fr/budget-et-
statistiques-10054/annuaires-statistiques-de-la-justice-10304/	
3	http://www.prisonstudies.org/news/more-700000-women-and-girls-are-prison-around-world-new-report-
shows	
4	England:	https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/police-workforce-england-and-wales-31-march-
2013/police-workforce-england-and-wales-31-march-2013	;	France:	http://infos.emploipublic.fr/metiers/les-
secteurs-qui-recrutent/les-metiers-de-la-securite/polices-municipale-et-nationale-gendarmerie-quelle-place-
pour-les-femmes/apm-4409/	.	
5	England	and	Wales:	http://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/oct/09/uk-lags-europe-gender-balance-judiciary	
;	USA:	https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/male-judges-far-outnumber-women-judges-federal-court-graph-shows	
.	
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observable	characteristics	–	 including	a	very	precise	description	of	 the	crime	–	this	gender	
gap	remains	sizable:	women	get	prison	sentences	that	are	16	days	shorter.	
	
However,	it	is	possible	that	some	differences	in	crimes	remain.	It	is	the	case	if,	for	example,	
men	 tend	 to	 commit	 the	 most	 severe	 offense	 within	 each	 (small)	 category.	 In	 order	 to	
overcome	this	problem,	this	paper	document	the	gender	gap	among	group	of	two	offenders	
of	 different	 sex	who	 are	 convicted	 together.	 In	 these	 situations,	 the	 charges,	 judges,	 and	
external	context	are	all	similar	for	the	members	of	the	group.	The	gender	gap	measured	by	
this	strategy	is	even	higher	than	what	was	measured	before,	with	an	average	difference	of	
38	prison	days.	
	
It	 is	 still	 possible	 that	 responsibilities	 diverge	 among	members	 of	 the	 group.	 Indeed,	 the	
gender	 gap	 could	 be	 explained	 if	 men	 tend	 to	 be	 leaders	 more	 frequently	 or	 if	 women	
present	unobserved	characteristics	that	are	associated	with	shorter	sentences.	I	address	this	
concern	by	restricting	the	sample	to	groups	in	which	either	the	woman	is	convicted	for	more	
charges	than	the	man	or	the	woman	has	more	past	convictions	than	the	man.	In	those	two	
situations,	women	have	 “worse”	 observable	 characteristics	 and	we	 can	 reasonably	 expect	
that	 the	man	 is	 less	 frequently	 the	 leader	 of	 the	 group.	 Even	 if	 the	 gender	 gap	 is	 either	
smaller	 or	 cancelled,	 women	 are	 far	 from	 being	 as	 harshly	 sentenced	 as	 in	 other	
heterogeneous	group	(when	men	have	the	worst	observed	characteristics	or	 in	non-mixed	
groups).	
	
If	 the	previous	 results	 are	driven	by	unobserved	heterogeneity	between	men	and	women	
(e.g.,	 family	 situation,	 professional	 status,	 academic	 level),	 the	 differences	 in	 sentencing	
should	not	be	affected	by	 the	 sex	of	 the	 judges.	On	 the	 contrary,	 if	 the	 size	of	 the	gap	 is	
affected	 by	 the	 gender	 composition	 of	 the	 court,	 it	 will	 reinforce	 the	 hypothesis	 of	
disparities	 in	 the	 judicial	 treatment	 of	 genders.	 I	 test	 this	 alternative	 by	 using	 the	 gender	
composition	of	the	court.	
	
Gender	gap	decreases	with	the	share	of	women	among	judges	in	the	court.	An	increase	of	
one	standard	deviation	in	the	share	of	women	decreases	the	gender	gap	by	1.5	prison	days	
(around	10%	of	 the	gender	gap).	Prosecutors	do	not	 seem	 to	affect	differences	neither	 in	
sentences	 nor	 in	 pre-trial	 decisions.	 This	 result	 is	 coherent	 with	 previous	 literature	 that	
focused	on	criminal	justice	in	the	US	and	used	a	very	similar	approach	(Schanzenbach	2005),	
along	 with	 several	 papers	 in	 education	 (Carrell	 Page	West	 2009;	 Boring	 2015)	 and	 labor	
economics	 (Kunze	Miller	 2014).	 This	 literature	 demonstrates	 that	 women	 tend	 to	 be	 less	
affected	by	gender,	even	when	this	means	being	harsher	on	women.	
	
This	 paper	 provides	 evidence	of	 a	 distorted	 treatment	 of	men	 and	women	by	 the	 judicial	
system.	Though,	the	results	cannot	be	interpreted	in	terms	of	discrimination	so	far.	Indeed,	
the	harshness	of	 sanction	could	be	different	–	 for	example	 if	prison	 for	women	are	worse	
than	 prison	 for	men	 –	 and	 the	 specific	 deterrence	 effect	 could	 also	 be	 different	 –	 if	 one	
prison	day	has	more	effect	on	women’s	 recidivism	 than	 it	has	on	men’s	 recidivism.	Those	
aspects	 are	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 paper	 but	 if	 one	 of	 them	 is	 true	 this	 constitute	 a	
rational	base	for	gender	disparities.	
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This	paper	 stands	at	 the	 frontier	of	 two	different	areas	of	 literature.	 The	 first	one	 follows	
Becker’s	 seminal	book	on	discrimination	 (Becker	2010)	and	 is	devoted	 to	gender	biases	 in	
different	 social	 areas.	 The	 two	most	 dynamic	 fields	 are	 education	 and	 labor.	 In	 a	 setting	
close	 to	 the	 last	 one	 used	 here,	 Kunze	 and	Miller	 (2014)	 use	 Norwegian	 data	 on	 private	
employment	 to	document	 the	 fact	 that	women	have	 fewer	 chances	 to	be	promoted	 than	
men	 do.	 More	 precisely:	 chances	 are	 higher	 when	 there	 are	 more	 women	 at	 the	 next	
hierarchical	 level	 but	 are	 lower	 when	 there	 are	 more	 women	 at	 the	 same	 rank.	 On	 the	
contrary,	 Bagues	 and	Volart	 (2010)	 show	 that	 in	 Spain,	women	have	 fewer	 chances	 to	be	
hired	when	there	are	more	women	on	the	recruitment	committee.		
	
In	education,	Carell	et	al	(2009)	document	the	effect	of	the	sex	of	the	teacher	on	students’	
performance.	 They	 show	 that	 the	 gender	 gap	 disappears	when	 teachers	 are	women.	 This	
effect	 is	partly	reversible.	Using	students’	evaluations	of	the	teachers,	Boring	(2014)	shows	
that,	 after	 controlling	 for	 performance,	 women	 obtain	 lower	 scores	 than	 their	 male	
colleagues	do.	This	discrimination	is	more	present	among	male	students.	
	
The	 second	 related	 literature	 follows	 Becker	 seminal	 paper	 on	 the	 economics	 of	 crime	
(Becker	 1968)	 and	 is	 devoted	 to	 optimal	 judicial	 decisions	 and	 bias.	 Several	 papers	 have	
already	 documented	 the	 importance	 of	 race	 (Shayo	 Zussman,	 2009;	 Anvar	 et	 al,	 2012;	
Depew	et	al,	2016),	age	(Anvar	et	al,	2014),	political	convictions	(Anvar	et	al,	2015),	media	
content	(Philippe	Ouss,	2015),	media	pressure	(Lim	et	al	2012),	and	cognitive	bias	(Guthrie	et	
al	2002).		
	
The	 effect	 of	 sex,	 from	 both	 the	 judges’	 and	 the	 defendants’	 perspectives,	 has	 also	 been	
addressed.	Though	judges	of	the	two	sexes	treated	the	majority	of	the	cases	equally	(Fischer,	
1997;	Boyd,	Epstein,	Martin,	2009),	some	differences	were	observed	for	decisions	regarding	
sexual	harassment,	abortion,	and	death	penalty.	For	male	judges,	having	a	daughter	seems	
to	increase	the	probability	of	voting	in	favor	of	women	(Glynn,	Sen,	2014).	The	importance	
of	 the	 gender	 gap	 among	 defendants	 has	 been	 addressed	 (Mustard,	 2001;	 Starr,	 2015;	
Depew	et	al	2016)	in	the	US	context.	As	in	the	present	work,	the	author	shows	that	women	
are	less	frequently	convicted	and	are	less	severely	sentenced	when	they	are	convicted.		Starr	
(2015)	 emphasizes	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 gender	 gap	 in	 pre-trial	 decisions.	 In	 particular,	
controlling	 for	 arrest	 offense,	 charges	 are	 less	 severe	 for	 women.	 Glaeser	 and	 Sacerdote	
(2003)	also	show	that	the	victims’	gender	matters.	In	vehicular	homicides,	offenders	who	kill	
women	 get	 59%	 longer	 sentences	 and	 offenders	who	 killed	 black	 people	 get	 60%	 shorter	
sentences.	
	
The	closest	work	 to	 the	one	presented	here	 is	 a	paper	by	Schanzenbach	 (2005),	who	also	
studies	the	interaction	between	the	gender	of	the	judges	and	the	gender	of	the	defendant.	
The	author	shows	that	average	sentences	do	not	diverge	depending	on	the	age,	race,	or	sex	
of	the	judges.	However,	Schanzenbach	documents	that	the	gender	gap	is	reduced	when	the	
judge	 is	a	woman	and	 that	 racial	minorities	are	 less	discriminated	against	when	 the	 judge	
also	 is	 of	 a	 racial	 minority.	 He	 interprets	 the	 first	 result	 as	 the	 sign	 of	 paternalistic	 bias	
among	male	judges.	
	
This	paper	replicates	some	results	 from	previous	studies	on	gender	gap	 in	criminal	 justice.	
Moreover,	 compared	 to	 the	 existing	 literature,	 it	 innovates	 in	 two	 ways.	 First,	 it	 uses	 a	
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simple	 measure	 of	 sentence	 heterogeneity	 within	 criminal	 groups	 –	 here	 duos.	 This	
procedure	 could	 easily	 be	 replicated	 for	 other	 questions	 such	 as	 racial	 bias.	 Second,	 it	
extends	the	work	done	by	Schanzenbach	(2005)	to	include	the	effect	of	prosecutors’	gender6.	
In	 addition	 to	 those	 innovations,	 this	 paper	 measure	 gender	 gap	 in	 a	 new	 institutional	
context.	
	
The	 rest	 of	 the	 paper	 is	 organized	 as	 follow.	 Section	 2	 gives	 information	 on	 institutional	
setting	in	France.	The	data	and	the	overall	gender	gap	are	presented	in	section	3.	The	fourth	
section	uses	the	composition	of	criminal	groups	to	document	the	differences	in	sentencing	
between	men	and	women.	The	effect	of	the	judges’	and	the	prosecutors’	sex	on	the	gender	
gap	is	presented	in	section	5.	Section	6	concludes.	
	
	
	
	 2.	Institutional	setting	
	
2.1.	Procedure	and	sentencing	
	
This	paper	focus	on	crimes	that	can	be	punished	by	prison	sentences	up	to	ten	years.	This	
criminal	 category	 –	 called	 “délits”	 in	 French	 –	 contains	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 what	 is	
commonly	viewed	as	crime:	theft,	violence,	drug	consumption	or	drug	dealing,	road	related	
offenses.	At	the	time	studied	in	this	article	(2000-2003),	there	were	around	400,000	crimes	
of	this	type	per	year7.	
	
There	is	no	plea-bargaining	in	France8	and	all	sentences	are	decided	after	a	trial.	The	courts	
that	 judge	 the	 infraction	 studied	 in	 this	paper	are	 composed	of	 three	professional	 judges.	
The	French	criminal	code	foresees	an	accelerated	procedure,	which	is	similar	to	the	normal	
one	except	that	the	investigation	term	is	extremely	short	(less	than	a	week).	The	prosecutor	
conducts	 the	 investigations	 –	 and	 eventually	 impose	 pre-trial	 detention9	-,	 choose	 the	
charges,	and	goes	for	an	accelerated	procedure	if	it	seems	appropriate.	
	
Every	type	of	crime	is	characterized	by	a	maximum	prison	sentence	going	from	zero	to	ten	
years.	Those	maximum	are	largely	bigger	than	sentences	pronounced	in	reality10.	There	are	
no	minimum	sentences	in	France	at	the	time	of	the	study11	12.	The	most	important	types	of	
sentences	 are	 prison,	 probation,	 suspended	 prison,	 community	 service	 and	 fines.	 In	 this	
paper	I	focus	on	the	three	first	sentences.	Probation	sentences	will	be	defined	by	the	prison																																																									
6	The	role	of	prosecutors	have	been	partly	addressed	in	Farell	et	al	2010	
7	There	is	two	other	categories:	minor	infractions	that	cannot	be	punished	by	prison	and	the	most	severe	
crimes	–	murder,	rape…	–	that	can	be	punished	by	very	long	sentences	and	are	judged	by	specific	courts.	
8	A	limited	one	has	been	introduced	after	the	period	of	interest.	It	remains	marginal	nowadays.	
9	However,	another	judge	controls	this	decision.	
10	For	e.g.,	in	2003,	49%	of	offenders	convicted	for	a	crime	that	could	be	punished	by	up	to	ten	years	get	no	
prison	sentence	and	95%	of	those	who	get	a	prison	sentence	get	one	shorter	or	equal	to	4	years.	
11	Minimum	sentences	for	recidivists	were	introduced	in	2007	and	removed	in	2014.	
12	Sentences	are	supposed	to	be	chosen	“according	to	the	circumstances	of	the	crime	and	the	offenders’	
personality	(…)	in	order	to	protect	society,	to	punish	the	offender,	to	protect	victims’	interests	and	in	order	to	
promote	offender’s	rehabilitation	and	to	avoid	new	crimes”	(art.	132-24	of	the	criminal	code,	change	into	art.	
130-1)	
	 7	
sentence	people	get	in	case	of	violation	of	their	probation13.	In	this	paper	I	will	treat	those	
different	sentences	as	independent14.	
	
	
2.2.	Courts	organization	
	
In	French	criminal	justice,	cases	are	attributed	to	judges	independently	of	the	characteristics	
of	the	judges	but	depending	on	the	characteristics	of	the	case	(type	of	crime	and	procedure	
of	judgment).	Apart	from	accelerated	procedure,	all	crimes	of	one	type	are	attributed	to	the	
same	 pool	 of	 judges.	 Cases	 heard	 according	 to	 accelerated	 procedure	 are	 attributed	 to	
different	pools	of	judges	in	accordance	with	the	date	of	the	facts.	
	
Jurisdictions	 are	 organized	 in	 several	 “chambers”	 responsible	 for	 the	 judgment	 of	 one	 or	
several	types	of	crime.	The	head	of	the	jurisdiction	organize	the	work	on	a	semester	basis.	A	
fix	 schedule	 allocates	 every	 judge	 to	 a	 single	 chamber,	 defines	 the	 types	 of	 crime	 each	
chamber	will	have	to	hear	and	decides	the	date	of	the	audiences	of	every	chamber.	Then,	
over	a	six	months	period,	the	three	same	judges	will	hear	every	crimes	of	one	type.	
	
In	 the	 largest	 courts,	 there	 are	 specific	 hearings	 for	 the	 cases	 heard	 according	 to	 the	
accelerated	 procedure.	 Those	 hearings	 are	 characterized	 by	 a	 high	 turnover	 and	 judges	
usually	rotate	every	week.	A	case	heard	according	to	the	accelerated	procedure	is	officially	
attributed	 to	one	of	 those	specific	hearings	 in	accordance	with	 the	date	of	 the	end	of	 the	
investigation.	 In	 practice,	 the	 date	 of	 the	 hearing	 depends	 on	 the	 date	 of	 the	 facts.	 As	 a	
consequence,	offenders	(and	their	lawyers)	cannot	choose	the	judges	they	will	face.		
	
In	France	both	judges	and	prosecutor	are	civil	servants.	There	are	roughly	5,500	judges	and	
1,800	 prosecutors15	hired	 through	 a	 common	 competitive	 exam.	 They	 can	 change	 from	
judge	 to	 prosecutor	 and	 vice-versa	 at	 different	 times	 during	 their	 career.	 Even	 if	 the	
frequency	is	not	clearly	defined,	judges	and	prosecutor	are	obliged	to	move	frequently	from	
one	court	 to	another	 (one	or	 two	years	 is	 too	short,	 three	or	 four	seem	to	be	optimal	 for	
junior	judges).		
	
	
	
	
	
	 3.	Data	
	
The	original	dataset	used	in	this	paper	is	a	compilation	of	criminal	records	from	the	statistics	
service	of	 the	French	Ministry	of	 Justice	 (Sous	Direction	de	 la	Statistique	et	des	Etudes).	 It	
contains	a	detailed	description	of	every	 criminal	 case	 judged	each	year.	More	precisely,	 it																																																									
13	Probation	length	are	not	recorded	in	the	database	
14	They	are	not	totally	unrelated	as	the	sum	of	the	three	should	not	exceed	the	maximum	define	in	the	penal	
code.	However,	as	mentioned	previously,	this	not	a	strong	limitation	in	reality.	
15	In	2007,	according	to	the	Supreme	Court.	https://www.courdecassation.fr/IMG/File/pdf_2007/10-05-
2007/10-05-2007_mcKee_fr.pdf	
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contains	 the	date,	 place,	 and	procedural	 detail	 of	 the	 trials;	 the	date	of	 the	 crime	and	 its	
exact	 category	 based	 on	 the	 criminal	 code;	 the	 sentence	 decided	 (e.g.,	 prison,	 probation,	
and	suspended	prison);	and,	finally,	sex,	age,	and	nationality.	Each	individual	is	identified	by	
a	single	ID	(constant	through	the	period).	This	enables	the	penal	history	of	an	individual	to	
be	reconstructed.	Because	the	data	on	court	compositions	are	only	available	 for	2000	and	
2003	and	for	the	court	of	first	instance	(see	section	4),	I	only	use	the	criminal	record	data	for	
the	same	period,	including	the	two	years	in	between.	
	
Descriptive	 statistics	 for	 all	 men	 and	 women	 convicted	 between	 2000	 and	 2003	 are	
presented	in	the	left	part	of	table	1	(column	1	to	4).	The	demographic	characteristics	of	the	
two	sexes	are	slightly	different:	women	are	older	and	more	frequently	French	than	men	are.	
Criminal	 careers	 diverge	 largely:	 32%	of	men	have	 already	been	 convicted	 in	 the	 last	 two	
years	while	only	17%	of	the	women	have.	This	 is	 important	since	past	conviction	 is	one	of	
the	most	important	aggravating	factors16.		
	
The	 infractions	 committed	 are	 not	 as	 different	 as	 one	would	 expect.	 The	 share	 of	 violent	
crime	 is	 almost	 equal	 (16%	 vs	 15%),	 even	 if	men	 are	 usually	 viewed	 as	more	 violent.	 The	
main	differences,	 regarding	 crime	 types,	 come	 from	 robbery	and	 road-related	 crimes.	 The	
former	is	predominant	among	female	offenders,	but	the	latter	is	more	frequent	among	men.	
This	 structure	 is	 important	because	 robbery	 is	 considered	a	more	severe	crime	 than	 road-
related	crime	and	is	more	severely	punished.	Regarding	the	severity	of	the	crime	–	measured	
by	the	longest	sentence	allowed	by	the	criminal	code	–	the	differences	between	women	and	
men	 are	 not	 extremely	 important.	 The	 largest	 divergences	 are	 observed	 for	 crimes	 that	
could	be	punished	by	a	maximum	of	2	or	3	years.	These	two	categories	are	not	far	from	one	
another.	
	
Even	 if	 the	 aggregate	 characteristics	 of	 the	 crimes	 are	 not	 extremely	 different,	 the	 trials’	
outcomes	 are.	 From	 a	 procedural	 point	 of	 view,	 women	 are	 judged	 after	 longer	
investigations	(30%	longer),	and	they	are	rarely	sentenced	after	accelerate	procedure	(trial	
within	a	week	after	arrest)	or	after	pre-trial	detention	 (4%	versus	7%)17.	 The	difference	 in	
investigation	length	between	men	and	women	is	mainly	due	to	the	crime	structure.	Taking	
crime	types	into	account	reduces	it	from	120	days	to	30.	On	the	contrary,	the	difference	in	
accelerate	procedure	rate	between	men	and	women	remains	high	after	controlling	for	crime	
(-3.4%	reduced	to	-2.5%).	
	
Women’s	 sentences	 are	 less	 severe.	 Prison	 and	 probation	 are	 less	 used	 against	 women	
(prison	is	13%	less	frequent	and	probation	3%	less	frequent).	Regarding	quanta,	prison	and	
probation	 sentences	 are	 shorter	 (18	 days	 shorter	 for	 prison	 and	 4	 days	 shorter	 for	
probation)	and	suspended	prison	sentences	are	longer	(8	days)	for	women.		
	
The	 difference	 in	 sentences	 between	men	 and	 women	 could	 be	 driven	 by	 differences	 in	
offenders’	characteristics.	However,	the	gender	gap	in	sentences	remains	sizable,	even	after	
controlling	for	all	the	observables	(see	appendix	A).	Indeed,	controlling	for	the	precise	crime																																																									
16	The	average	prison	sentence	over	the	sample	goes	from	30	days	to	77	days	for	offenders	who	have	already	
been	convicted.	
17	Those	characteristics	are	associated	with	longer	sentences.	For	e.g.	Offenders	convicted	after	an	accelerated	
procedure	get	sentences	twice	longer	(44	days	vs	105).	See	Christin,	Lenoir	2008.	
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structure	(1395	dummies),	place	(175	dummies),	time	(4	dummies	for	years,	12	for	months),	
socio-demographic	 characteristics,	 type	 of	 procedure	 and	 criminal	 career),	women	have	 a	
8%	lower	chance	to	be	sent	to	prison	(35%	reduction	in	comparison	to	the	22%	average	in	
the	sample)	and	their	average	prison	time	is	15	days	shorter	than	for	men	(33%	shorter	than	
the	44	days	average	in	the	sample).	They	also	have	slightly	more	chances	to	get	suspended	
prison	time	(or	probation)	
	
The	differences	between	men	and	women	that	survive	to	crime	structure	and	other	control	
variables	 could	 still	 be	 due	 to	 unobserved	 variables.	 Educational	 attainment,	 job,	 family	
structure,	presence	or	absence	of	children	could	strongly	differ	between	male	and	female.	
Those	variables	could	explain	why	women	are	sentenced	less	severely	than	men	even	in	the	
absence	of	an	effect	of	the	gender	itself.					
	 4.	Gender	gap	within	criminal	groups	
	
Men	 and	 women	 receive	 different	 sentences,	 even	 after	 controlling	 for	 a	 large	 set	 of	
covariates	 that	 includes	very	precise	crime	categories.	This	gap	could	have	several	origins:	
differences	 in	 the	 crime	 severity	 within	 criminal	 categories	 defined	 by	 the	 criminal	 code;	
differences	among	unobserved	socio-economics	characteristics	(e.g.,	education,	family);	and	
differential	treatment	by	the	judicial	system.	
	
To	 further	 investigate	 the	 gender	 gap,	 this	 section	 documents	 the	 gender	 gap	 in	 mixed	
criminal	 groups.	 Within	 each	 group,	 offenders	 were	 convicted	 for	 the	 same	 crime,	
committed	on	the	same	day	 in	the	same	place,	and	judged	by	the	same	court	 in	the	same	
external	context.	
	
The	 sample	used	 in	 this	 section	 is	a	 specific	 subsample	of	 the	main	database.	Gender	gap	
among	 criminal	 groups	 can	 be	 different	 from	 the	 one	 observed	 in	 the	 general	 case	 as	
observed	by	 Starr	 (Starr,	 2015,	 p10).	 Then,	 the	external	 validity	of	 this	 exercise	 is	 limited.	
However	 it	 provides	 an	 interesting	 setting	 in	which	 case	heterogeneity	 between	men	and	
women	are	smaller.	
	
	
4.1.	Identifying	peer	groups	
	
People	 will	 be	 considered	 as	 belonging	 to	 the	 same	 criminal	 group	 if	 they	 have	 been	
convicted	 for	 a	 crime	 that	 they	 committed	 together.	 This	 information	 is	 not	 directly	
registered	in	the	dataset,	as	there	is	no	ID	per	criminal	case	but	per	individual.	However,	the	
dataset	 does	 record	 whether	 the	 crime	 has	 been	 committed	 "in	 group"18.	 This	 does	 not	
necessarily	mean	that	the	rest	of	the	group	has	been	arrested.	If	only	one	person	is	arrested	
among	three	robbers	who	work	together,	the	crime	is	still	registered	as	a	"robbery	in	group".		
																																																									
18	People	convicted	for	a	crime	"en	réunion",	"en	association",	as	"complice"	or	in	a	"trafic".	
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To	 identify	 the	 composition	of	 the	 criminal	 groups,	 I	 proceed	as	 follows.	 First,	 I	 only	 keep	
people	 who	 have	 been	 convicted	 for	 crimes	 committed	 "in	 group".	 Then,	 I	 am	 sure	 that	
those	 persons	 have	 criminal	 partners,	 even	 if	 those	 peers	 were	 not	 necessarily	 arrested.	
Second,	among	this	subset,	I	consider	people	to	be	convicted	for	the	same	crime	when	they	
are	judged	in	the	same	place	(175	courts),	on	the	same	date,	and	for	the	same	type	of	crime	
(172	in-group	crimes)	that	was	committed	on	the	same	day.	These	criteria	are	restrictive.	For	
example,	people	could	commit	 the	same	 type	of	 crime,	on	 the	same	day	and	 in	 the	same	
place,	but	being	judged	on	two	different	days.	However,	those	cases	are	difficult	to	identify,	
and	having	strict	criteria	limits	the	number	of	false	matches.	
	
Among	the	persons	who	commit	a	crime	"in	group",	I	find	at	least	one	partner	in	59%	of	the	
cases.	 In	 comparison,	 the	 same	 strategy	applied	 to	offenders	who	do	not	 commit	a	 crime	
described	as	"in	group"19	leads	to	the	identification	of	a	"partner"	in	18.7%	of	the	cases.	This	
rate	could	be	viewed	as	high	and	problematic	if	it	is	interpreted	as	a	"false	match	rate"	equal	
to	one	over	five.	However,	this	interpretation	is	not	correct.	First,	the	latter	group	is	seven	
times	 larger	 than	 the	 former	 (810,000	 vs	 115,000	 offenders).	 In	 a	 large	 group,	 there	 are	
more	chances	to	find	two	persons	who	were	convicted	on	the	same	day,	in	the	same	court,	
for	a	crime	of	the	same	type	that	was	committed	on	the	same	day.	 If	18.7%	represent	the	
proportion	of	false	matches	in	a	group	of	810,000	persons,	this	rate	is	2.6%	in	the	group	of	
interest.	Second,	a	 large	proportion	of	 the	"false	matches”	are	probably	 real	matches	 that	
have	 been	 rejected	 from	 the	 main	 data	 set	 because	 of	 the	 strict	 criteria.	 For	 example,	
approximately	 26.2%	 of	 the	 matches	 are	 found	 in	 the	 categories	 "robbery	 with	 two	
aggravating	 circumstances"	 and	 "violence	 with	 two	 aggravating	 circumstances".	 Further,	
they	 probably	 represent	 crimes	 that	 were	 committed	 within	 the	 group,	 even	 if	 this	
circumstance	is	not	clearly	mentioned	because	of	the	presence	of	a	second	one20.	
	
In	this	analysis,	we	are	only	interested	in	groups	composed	of	one	man	and	one	woman.	For	
the	sake	of	simplicity,	I	also	restrict	the	analysis	to	duos	(excluding	triplets,	quadruplets,	etc.)	
that	 comprise	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 the	 sample.	 Over	 the	 2000-2003	 period,	 I	 find	 2,382	
mixed	duos	regrouping	4,764	offenders	(2,382	women	and	2,382	men).		
	
It	 is	 important	 to	 notice	 that	 the	 different	 offenders	 of	 each	 group	 are	 convicted	 for	 the	
same	main	crime.	Groups	in	which	offenders	get	different	charges	are	excluded.	In	particular,	
groups	in	which	one	person	is	convicted	for	“failure	to	assist	a	person	in	danger”,	“assistance	
to	 commit	a	 crime”,	 “non	denunciation”,	etc.	 are	excluded21.	Groups	 in	which	women	are	
charged	 for	 less	 severe	 crime	 even	 when	 crimes	 are	 similar	 are	 excluded	 and,	 then,	 the	
gender	gap	is	measured	net	of	the	disparities	in	the	charging	decision.		
	
Descriptive	 statistics	 of	 these	 groups	 are	 presented	 in	 table	 1,	 column	 5	 to	 8.	 In-group	
offenders	 are	 younger	 (30	 years	 old)	 and	 less	 frequently	 French	 (around	75%)	 than	 is	 the	
average	convicted	population.	The	crime	structure	is	different,	with	a	large	predominance	of																																																									
19	Road	related	offenses	are	dropped	here	as	they	could	not	be	committed	in	group.	They	are	mainly	composed	
of	"driving	under	influence"	and	driving	without	a	license	or	insurance.	
20	Another	16.5%	is	composed	of	drug	use	without	the	mention	of	trafficking.	In	France,	the	difference	is	mainly	
driven	by	the	quantity	seized	by	the	police.		
21	Obviously,	cases	were	the	crimes	are	different	like	drug-dealing	vs	drug	consumption,	theft	vs	fencing,	
procuring	vs	prostitution	are	also	excluded.	
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robbery	 (65%),	 followed	by	 violence	 (15%)	 and	 drug	 use	 (15%).	 Finally,	 the	 sentences	 are	
harsher	than	those	for	average	offenders	(80	prison	days	on	average	versus	47	in	the	general	
convicted	population).	This	is	coherent	with	the	fact	that	having	committed	a	crime	in-group	
constitutes	an	aggravating	circumstance.	
	
Within	the	groups,	men	are	on	average	older,	 less	frequently	French	and	they	have	 longer	
criminal	 careers.	 Their	 sentences,	however,	 remain	 largely	harsher	 than	 those	decided	 for	
women.	The	average	prison	days	are	almost	doubled	 (102	days	versus	57),	which	 is	partly	
counterbalanced	by	shorter	suspended	prison	terms	(40	versus	53).	The	probation	times	are	
similar.	
	
	
4.2.	Main	results	
	
Mixed	peer	groups	allow	gender	differences	 to	be	measured	within	duos.	 I	 first	document	
the	share	of	groups	 in	which	men	are	more,	equally	or	 less	severely	sentenced	as	women.	
This	work	is	presented	in	figure	1.	We	can	first	see	that	sentences	are	usually	equal.	Overall,	
70%	of	the	duos	receive	the	same	prison	term	or	the	same	suspended	prison	time,	and	more	
than	 85%	 receive	 the	 same	 probation	 time.	 This	 is	 partly	 because	 some	 of	 the	 duos	 are	
composed	 of	 two	 offenders	 who	 receive	 no	 prison	 (65%),	 no	 probation	 (81%),	 or	 no	
suspended	prison	(50%).	
	
More	interesting	is	the	fact	than	when	sentences	diverge,	the	shares	of	cases	where	women	
are	more	or	less	severely	sentenced	are	not	balanced.	Regarding	prison	time,	it	is	usually	the	
men	 who	 receive	 the	 longest	 sentence:	 22%	 of	 the	 time	 versus	 4%.	 The	 inverse	 is	 true	
regarding	suspended	prison	sentences:	women	receive	longer	sentences	in	19%	of	the	cases	
versus	10%	for	men.		
	
The	 same	picture	emerges	 from	 the	analysis	 of	 the	 type	of	 sentence	used	 (instead	of	 the	
quanta).	Figure	2	presents,	for	each	type	of	sentence,	the	proportion	of	duos	in	which	none	
of	the	offenders	gets	prison	(resp.	probation	or	suspended	prison),	both	offenders	get	prison	
(resp.	probation	or	suspended	prison),	only	 the	man	gets	 it	or	only	 the	woman	gets	 it.	No	
one	 gets	 prison	 in	 64.4%	of	 the	 cases;	 both	 get	 it	 in	 17.5%	of	 the	 cases;	 only	 the	man	 in	
15.7%	of	the	cases	and	only	the	woman	in	2.4%	of	the	cases.	Then,	the	man	is	frequently	the	
only	 one	 to	 get	 a	 prison	 sentence.	 Men	 are	 the	 only	 one	 to	 get	 probation	 sentence	 as	
frequently	as	women	are.	Women	are	frequently	the	only	one	to	get	suspended	prison.	
	
I	further	investigate	those	observations	using	regression	of	the	following	form:	
	 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒!,! = 𝜎! + 𝛼! ∗ 𝑠𝑒𝑥! + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑋! + 𝜀		 (2)	
	
where	𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒!,!	is	the	outcome	variable	(e.g.,	prison	day,	probation	day)	of	person	i	who	
belongs	 to	 group	 g;	𝜎!	are	 group	 fixed	 effects	 (2383	 dummies);	𝑠𝑒𝑥! 	is	 a	 dummy	 equal	 to	
one	if	i	is	a	woman;	and	𝑋!  is	a	set	of	control	variables	(i.e.,	age,	age	square,	past	convictions,	
nationality,	 criminal	 career).	 Contrarily	 to	 date,	 place	 or	 crime	 type	 –	 that	 are,	 by	
construction,	 identical	 within	 groups	 –	 the	 control	 variables	 used	 in	 equation	 (2)	 are	 not	
equal	within	groups.	Those	variables	can	then	be	identified.	
	 12	
	
The	results	are	presented	in	table	2.	The	first	three	columns	present	the	effect	of	the	sex	on	
average	sentences	for	prison,	probation,	and	suspended	prison.	The	gender	gap	among	duos	
is	even	larger	than	the	one	observed	in	the	entire	sample.	Women	receive	prison	sentences	
that	 are	 38	 days	 shorter	 (50%	 decrease	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	 average	 prison	 sentence),	
probation	sentences	that	are	3	days	shorter	(11%	decrease)	and	suspended	prison	sentences	
that	are	10	days	 longer	than	men	receive	(21%	increase).	Men	have	a	higher	chance	to	be	
sentenced	 to	prison	 (+9.6%),	but	a	 lower	 chance	of	getting	 suspended	prison	 sentences	 (-
7.5%).	
	
	
	
4.3.	Leadership	
	
When	a	crime	 is	 committed	 in	a	group,	 judges	are	 supposed	 to	punish	 the	offenders	who	
have	the	largest	responsibility	more	severely.	If	men	are	more	often	the	leaders	of	the	duos	
or	frequently	commit	a	larger	share	of	the	crime	(e.g.,	sell	more	drugs,	land	more	punches),	
this	 could	explain	 the	pattern	observed	 in	 the	 last	 subsection.	Note	 that	 this	difference	 in	
responsibility	 should	 occur,	 by	 construction,	 within	 identical	 criminal	 categories.	 As	
previously	mentioned,	cases	in	which	one	offender	is	convicted	for	a	less	severe	crime	or	for	
helping	others	commit	a	crime	are	excluded	from	the	analysis	because	they	could	not	have	
been	selected	as	a	group	during	the	data	construction	procedure.	
	
The	 leadership	 among	 the	 group	 is	 not	 identifiable	 in	 the	 data	 and	 I	 cannot	 rule	 out	 the	
hypothesis	of	 a	differential	 responsibility.	However,	 in	order	 to	 investigate	 this	question,	 I	
focus	on	 two	characteristics	 that	are	usually	associated	with	harsher	sentences.	When	the	
woman	get	one	of	them	and	the	man	do	not,	the	hypothesis	of	a	higher	implication	of	the	
man	(on	average)	is	still	possible	but	seems	less	convincing.	
	
The	 first	 characteristic	 I	 use	 is	 the	 number	 of	 charges.	 By	 construction,	 the	main	 crime	 is	
identical	within	groups	but	offenders	could	also	be	convicted	for	other	crimes.	For	example,	
two	persons	could	commit	a	burglary	together	but	it	is	possible	that	only	one	is	responsible	
for	 selling	 the	 stolen	 goods.	 Among	 non	mixed	 groups,	 the	 offender	who	 is	 convicted	 for	
more	crimes	than	the	other	gets	longer	prison	time	in	30%	of	the	case	while	the	contrary	is	
true	 in	 only	 11%	 of	 the	 cases	 (appendix	 B	 figure	 B1).	 Then,	 the	 characteristic	 “being	
convicted	for	more	crimes	than	the	peer”	is	clearly	associated	with	harsher	sentences.	
	
Among	 duos	 where	 women	 are	 convicted	 to	 more	 charges	 than	 men	 (136	 duos)22,	 the	
proportion	in	which	women	receive	higher/equal/shorter	sentences	is	presented	in	figure	3a.	
Men	 receive	 longer	 prison	 sentences	 than	women	 do	more	 frequently	 than	 the	 contrary.	
The	 lag	 between	 those	 two	 situations	 decreases	 –	 compared	 to	 the	 results	 observed	 in	
figure	1	–,	but	the	former	is	still	2.5	times	more	frequent	than	the	latter	(25%	vs	9.6%).	On	
the	contrary,	women	receive	longer	suspended	prison	sentences	more	frequently.	When	the	
man	 is	 convicted	 for	 more	 crimes	 than	 the	 woman,	 the	 pattern	 observed	 in	 figure	 1	 is	
accentuated.	Men	get	longer	prison	times	13	times	more	frequently	than	woman	do	(figure	
3b).																																																									
22	Descriptive	statistics	of	those	groups	are	presented	in	appendix	B	(table	B1,	columns	1	and	2).		
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The	 second	 characteristic	 I	 use	 is	 criminal	 record.	 Among	 non	 mixed	 groups,	 when	 one	
offender	 has	 been	 convicted	more	 frequently	 than	 the	 other	 he	 receives	 a	 longer	 prison	
sentence	 29.9%	 of	 the	 time	 and	 a	 shorter	 prison	 sentence	 only	 7.5%	 of	 the	 time	 (see	
appendix	 B,	 graph	 B2).	 Probation	 time	 is	 also	 frequently	 longer	 (11.3%	 vs	 7.5%)	 while	
probation	time	is	usually	shorter	(5%	vs.	23%).	
	
Among	 duos	 where	 women	 have	 a	 longer	 criminal	 career	 than	 men	 (255	 duos)23,	 the	
proportion	in	which	women	receive	higher/equal/shorter	sentences	is	presented	in	figure	4a.	
Women	receive	longer	prison	time	only	slightly	more	frequently	than	the	contrary	(16.5%	vs	
14.1%).	In	the	same	time,	when	the	man	has	a	longer	criminal	record,	he	receives	a	longer	
prison	sentence	25	times	more	frequently	than	the	woman	do	(figure	4b).		
	
The	results	of	the	regressions	on	the	two	main	subgroups	–	groups	 in	which	the	woman	is	
convicted	 to	 more	 crimes	 than	 the	 man	 and	 groups	 in	 which	 the	 woman	 has	 a	 longer	
criminal	career	than	the	man	–	are	presented	in	table	3.	The	number	of	crimes	convicted	is	
no	 longer	 used	 as	 a	 control	 variable	 in	 regressions	on	 the	 first	 subgroup	and	 the	 criminal	
record	 is	 not	 used	 as	 control	 variable	 for	 the	 second	 subgroup.	 Men	 still	 receive	 longer	
prison	sentences	in	groups	were	women	are	convicted	to	more	crime.	Among	groups	were	
women	have	a	longer	criminal	career,	gender	is	not	significant.	
	
While	 offenders	who	 are	 convicted	 to	more	 crimes	 or	 have	 longer	 criminal	 history	 in	 the	
group	 are,	 in	 general,	more	 severely	 punished	 than	 their	 co-offender,	 this	 is	 not	 the	 case	
among	 mixed	 group	 when	 the	 woman	 have	 those	 characteristics.	 	 Women	 who	 are	
convicted	 to	 more	 numerous	 crimes	 are	 still	 less	 severely	 punished.	 Those	 with	 longer	
criminal	history	get	sentences	similar	to	their	male	co-offender.	Men	could	still	be	leaders	of	
the	 group	 or	 frequently	 present	 some	 unobserved	 characteristics	 that	 induced	 higher	
sentences	 (or	 do	 not	 present	 some	 characteristics	 related	 with	 shorter	 sentences	 like	
children	 or	 job).	 However,	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 gender	 gap	 does	 not	 reverse	 and	 sometimes	
remains	 even	when	women	have	 “worse”	 observable	 characteristics	 is	 striking.	 It	 pleas	 in	
favor	of	the	existence	of	gender	disparities	in	criminal	justice	that	are	not	explained	by	case	
characteristics	nor	unobserved	heterogeneity					
	
	 5.	Gender	bias	and	gender	of	the	court	
	
Up	to	this	point,	we	cannot	rule	out	the	hypothesis	that	gender	differences	are	entirely	due	
to	 unobserved	 heterogeneity	 even	 if	 this	 is	 unlikely	 considering	 the	 high	 homophily	 rate	
among	 criminal	 groups	 (see	 for	 e.g.	 Grund	 Denseley	 2014;	 Young,	 2011).	 If,	 for	 example,	
women	more	frequently	have	children	or	work,	 this	could	explain	the	gap	observed	 in	the	
last	two	sections.	If	the	unobserved	heterogeneity	problem	is	hard	to	address,	it	is	possible	
to	see	if	different	conditions	affect	the	gender	gap.		
																																																									
23	Descriptive	statistics	of	the	groups	in	which	women	have	a	longer	criminal	career	than	men	are	presented	in	
appendix	B	(table	B1,	columns	3	and	4).	Property	crimes	are	over	represented.	
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In	 this	 section,	 I	 focus	 on	 the	 gender	 composition	 of	 the	 court.	 This	 dimension	 is	 a	 priori	
orthogonal	 to	 the	 offenders’	 characteristics.	 If	 we	 observe	 differences	 in	 gender	 gap	
depending	on	 the	 sex	of	 the	 court,	we	will	 have	evidence	of	 a	distorted	 treatment	of	 the	
sexes	by	the	judicial	system.	
	
	
5.1.	Court	data	
	
Data	on	gender	composition	of	French	criminal	courts	come	from	the	magistrate	directories	
of	 2000	 and	 200324.	 For	 those	 two	 years,	 I	 gather	 data	 on	 the	 175	 first	 court	 instances.	 I	
compute	data	on	the	sex	of	the	presidents	of	the	court;	sex	of	the	state	prosecutor	(the	chief	
of	 the	 prosecutors	 in	 the	 court);	 number	 of	 judges	 (excluding	 examining	 magistrate	 and	
judges	 dealing	 in	 cases	 involving	 minors);	 number	 of	 female	 judges	 (idem);	 number	 of	
prosecutors;	and	number	of	female	prosecutors.	
	
Women	are	quite	numerous	in	the	French	judicial	system.	They	represent	54%	of	the	judges	
in	2000	and	50%	in	2003.	However,	they	are	under	represented	among	prosecutors	(34%	in	
2000,	40%	in	2003).	This	relative	equality	among	the	sexes	in	terms	of	access	to	the	judicial	
profession	masks	strongly	distorted	hierarchical	positions.	For	both	judges	and	prosecutors,	
women	are	far	more	numerous	in	“low”	rank	positions.	They	are	only	less	than	20%	of	the	
presiding	judges	(15%	in	2000,	19%	in	2003)	and	only	10%	of	the	state	prosecutors25.	
	
	
5.2.	Empirical	strategy	
	
Merging	the	data	from	criminal	records	with	the	data	on	courts’	gender	composition,	I	can	
now	measure	the	effect	of	the	sex	of	judges	and	prosecutors	on	gender	gap	in	sentencing.	
The	 simplest	 identification	 strategy	 would	 rely	 on	 the	 variations	 in	 courts’	 gender	
composition	per	years	and	places.	I	would	then	measure	the	effect	by	running	regressions	of	
the	following	form:	
	 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!,!,! = 𝛼! + 𝛼! ∗ 𝑠𝑒𝑥! + 𝛼! ∗% 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛!,!+ 𝛼! ∗ 𝑠𝑒𝑥! ∗% 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛!,!	+𝛽 ∗ 𝑋!,!,! + 𝜀	 	 	 	 (3)	
	
where	𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒!,!,!	is	 the	outcome	of	 interest	 (sentence,	procedural	variables)	of	person	 i	
convicted	at	time	t	in	place	p;	𝑠𝑒𝑥! 	is	a	dummy	equal	to	one	if	i	is	a	woman;	% 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛!,!	is	
the	proportion	of	women	among	judges	or	prosecutors	at	time	t	in	place	p;	and	𝑋!,!,!	is	a	set	
of	control	variables.		𝛼!	measures	the	effect	of	offenders’	sex,	𝛼!	is	 the	effect	of	 judges’	or	prosecutors’	gender	
on	average	sentences	and	𝛼!	is	the	parameter	of	interest,	measuring	the	effect	of	judges’	or	
prosecutors’	sex	on	gender	gap.	
																																																									
24	Directories	are	no	longer	published	since	2003	and	only	up	to	date	directory	is	available	on	line.	
25	.	This	pattern	fits	well	with	research	in	the	labor	economy	mentioned	in	the	introduction:	women	are	
strongly	disadvantaged	regarding	promotion	and	access	to	high-rank	positions	(Kunze	Miller	2014).	This	
situation	seems	to	improve	slightly	between	2000	and	2003	
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This	 strategy	would	 rely	 on	 two	 sources	 of	 identification.	 The	 first	 one	 is	 based	 on	 court	
variations.	For	e.g.,	in	2000,	the	share	of	women	among	judges	is,	on	average,	51%	but	vary	
between	0%	and	100%	with	50%	of	the	sample	between	40%	(25th	percentile)	and	66%	(75th	
percentile).	The	second	source	of	 identification	is	within	court	variation	between	2000	and	
2003.	The	average	variation	 is	 close	 to	 zero	–	as	 it	 is	 a	 zero	 sum	game	due	 to	 rotation	of	
judges	between	courts	and	only	slightly	affected	by	recruitment	and	retirement	–	but	25%	of	
the	court	experiment	a	decrease	of	women	proportion	among	judges	bigger	than	16%	(up	to	
-50%)	and	25%	of	the	court	experiment	an	increase	higher	than	11%	(up	to	+75%).	
	
This	 strategy	 is	 valid	 only	 if	women,	whether	 judges	 or	 prosecutors,	 are	 randomly	 spread	
among	 time	 and	 jurisdictions.	 If	 the	 proportion	 of	women	 in	 the	 court	 is	 correlated	with	
offenders’	 characteristics	 then	 the	 previous	 equation	 will	 lead	 to	 biased	 estimates.	 This	
problem	could	be	tested	for	the	two	sources	of	identification.		
	
The	 correlation	 between	 the	 proportion	 of	 women	 in	 the	 court	 and	 observable	
characteristics	 of	 the	 offenders	 is	 presented	 in	 appendix	 C.	 It	 appears	 that	 gender	
composition	 of	 the	 court	 is	 correlated	 with	 several	 observable	 characteristics	 of	 the	
offenders	 –	 especially	 sex	 but	 also	 nationality,	 pre-trial	 detention,	 procedure	 and	
investigation	length	(see	appendix	C,	table	C1).	Then,	between	court	variations	in	judges’	or	
prosecutors’	gender	do	not	seem	to	be	a	good	source	of	identification.	
	
On	the	contrary,	changes	in	the	gender	composition	of	the	court	between	2000	and	2003	do	
not	seem	to	be	correlated	with	observable	characteristics	(see	appendix	C,	table	C2).	This	is	
coherent	with	 the	 idea	 that	 those	 temporal	 variations	 are	mainly	 due	 to	 judges’	 rotation.	
Then,	 within	 courts	 variation	 in	 the	 gender	 composition	 appear	 to	 be	 a	 better	 source	 of	
identification.	
	
As	 variation	among	 jurisdiction	 is	 correlated	with	 the	 gender	 gap,	 I	 turn	 to	 a	model	using	
changes	 over	 time	 as	 the	 unique	 source	 of	 identification.	 I	 neutralize	 variations	 among	
courts	by	adding	places*sex	fixed	effects.	I	then	use	a	regression	of	the	following	form:	
	 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒!,!,! = 𝛼! + (𝛾! ∗ 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒! + 𝛿! ∗ 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒! ∗ 𝑠𝑒𝑥!!"#!!! )+ 𝛼! ∗% 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛!,!	+ 𝛼! ∗ 𝑠𝑒𝑥! ∗% 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛!,! + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑋!,!,! + 𝜀	 	 (4)	
	
where	the	notation	is	similar	to	that	used	in	the	previous	equations	and	𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒!	is	a	dummy	
equal	to	one	if	the	trial	occurred	in	place	p.	
	
The	 second	 term	 of	 the	 right	 member	 in	 equation	 (4)	 captures	 all	 the	 gender	 variations	
between	places.	It	is	a	list	of	2*175	(two	sex	and	175	courts)	fixed	effects	for	being	a	man	in	
jurisdiction	1,	a	woman	in	jurisdiction	1,	a	man	in	jurisdiction	2,	and	so	on.	Then,	all	of	the	
variations	between	men	and	women	across	places	are	absorbed.	The	remaining	variations	in	% 𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛	come	from	changes	over	time	due	to	judges’	and	prosecutors’	rotations.	
	
Errors	 are	 clustered	 at	 the	 court	 level. 𝛼! remains	 the	 parameter	 of	 interest	 because	 it	
measures	the	effect	of	judges’	or	prosecutors’	sex	on	gender	gap.	
	 16	
	
It	is	important	to	notice	than	the	effect	of	gender	composition	of	the	court	could	be	twofold.	
Firstly,	 women	 could	 judge	 men	 and	 women	 differently	 and	 affect	 the	 gender	 gap	 by	
changing	 the	 average	 sentences.	 Secondly,	 the	 share	 of	 women	 could	 affect	 all	 judges’	
decisions	 by	 changing	 the	 way	 their	 male	 colleagues	 judge	 men	 and	 women	 (like	 for	
example	the	effect	of	daughters	on	judges’	decisions	documented	in	Glyn	Sen,	2015).	As	the	
database	does	not	contain	the	sex	of	the	judge	for	every	single	decision	(but	only	the	gender	
composition	of	each	court),	those	two	channels	could	not	be	disentangled.		
	
	
5.3.	The	effect	of	judges’	sex	
	
The	effects	of	the	number	of	women	among	courts’	judges	are	presented	in	table	4.	As	we	
can	 see	 in	 the	 first	 line,	 the	 sex	of	 the	 judges	does	not	 affect	 the	average	 sentences.	 The	
point	 estimates	 are	 small	 and	 non-significant.	 Women	 do	 not	 seem	 to	 be	 harsher	 “in	
general”.	
	
However,	 as	 presented	 in	 line	 4	 (“Woman	 *	 Prop	 women	 judge”),	 the	 share	 of	 women	
among	 judges	 does	 affect	 the	 gender	 gap.	When	 it	 increases,	 offenders	 who	 are	women	
receive,	 on	 average,	 a	 longer	 prison	 term,	 longer	 probation	 time	 and	 shorter	 suspended	
prison	time.		
	
A	one-standard-deviation	increase	in	the	share	of	women	among	judges	increases	the	prison	
sentences	for	women	by	1.6	days	(a	10%	reduction	of	the	gender	gap),	probation	by	1.7	days	
and	decreases	suspended	prison	time	by	1.7	days	(columns	1	to	3).	These	results	represent	a	
decrease	 in	the	gender	gap.	Columns	4	to	6	 indicate	that	the	results	do	not	come	from	an	
increase	in	the	probability	to	send	women	to	jail	or	in	probation.	
	
Thus,	the	gender	gap	in	sentencing	seems	to	partly	depend	on	judges’	sex.	This	 is	a	strong	
argument	 in	favor	of	the	hypothesis	of	a	distorted	treatment	of	sex	by	the	judicial	system.	
This	 is	still	possible	that	 female	offenders	present	some	characteristics–	regarding	work	or	
family	–	and	 that	 female	 judges	are	not	as	attentive	 to	 those	characteristics	as	 their	male	
colleagues.	Even	 if	 this	hypothesis	cannot	be	 refuted	so	 far,	 the	hypothesis	of	a	distortion	
based	 on	 sex	 remains	more	 parsimonious.	 These	 results	 are	 similar	 to	 those	 obtained	 by	
Schanzenbach	 (2005)	 and	 Starr	 (2015)	 in	 the	 US	 context.	 Schanzenbach	 interprets	 this	
decrease	 of	 the	 gender	 gap	 as	 a	 sign	 of	 a	 paternalistic	 bias	 among	 male	 judges.	 This	 is	
possible	but,	as	it	is	impossible	to	know	what	the	“correct”	sentence	is,	those	results	could	
also	come	from	excessively	harsh	sentences	given	by	female	judges	to	female	offenders.			
	
The	effect	of	judges’	sex	on	gender	gap	varies	depending	on	offenders’	characteristics	(see	
appendix	 D).	 Women	 seem	 to	 be	 less	 “tolerant”	 (or	 harsher)	 than	 men	 with	 violence	
committed	by	women.	 Interestingly,	 the	effect	of	 judges’	 sex	 is	more	 important	on	young	
offenders.	This	 is	coherent	with	Schanzenbach’s	 interpretation:	 if	 the	gender	gap	 is	due	to	
some	paternalistic	biased,	it’s	not	surprising	to	find	that	the	effect	of	judges’	sex	is	bigger	on	
young	offenders	among	which	women	could	be	viewed	as	more	fragile.		
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5.4.	The	effect	of	prosecutors’	sex	
	
Prosecutors	 could	 also	 affect	 the	 gender	 gap.	 Firstly,	 they	 could	 select	 different	 charges,	
choose	 different	 procedures	 –	 especially	 accelerated	 procedures	 –	 and	 they	 could	 ask	 for	
pre-trial	detention	(their	decisions	have	to	be	confirmed	by	another	 judge	but	they	trigger	
the	process).	Secondly	they	could	directly	affect	sentences	by	asking	for	more	or	less	severe	
sentences.		
	
The	effects	of	the	number	of	women	among	prosecutors	are	presented	in	table	5.	The	effect	
of	prosecutor’s	gender	on	charges	is	hard	to	measure	in	the	absence	of	cases’	characteristics	
at	the	moment	of	the	arrest	or	in	the	beginning	of	the	justice	process	(as	in	Starr,	2015).	The	
only	 way	 to	 approach	 this	 question	 is	 to	 measure	 how	 prosecutors’	 gender	 affects	 the	
severity	of	the	charges	conditional	on	the	type	of	crime.	A	good	proxy	for	the	severity	of	the	
charge	is	the	highest	sentence	that	could	be	chosen	for	the	crime	according	to	the	criminal	
code	(going	from	0	to	10	years).	Then,	I	measure	the	effect	of	the	sex	of	the	prosecutor	on	
crime	severity,	conditional	on	crime	category,	split	in	26	“large”	categories	(for	e.g.,	property	
crimes	are	divided	in	three	categories:	theft,	selling	stolen	goods,	vandalism).		
	
Results	 are	 presented	 in	 the	 first	 column	 of	 table	 5.	 Based	 on	 this	 (imperfect)	 measure,	
women’s	 charges	 do	 not	 seem	 to	 be	 affected	 by	 the	 sex	 of	 the	 prosecutor.	 The	 point	
estimate	 of	 the	 interaction	 is	 both	 non	 significant	 and	 extremely	 low	 (-2	 days	 while	
maximum	sentences	goes	up	to	10	years).	
	
Table	5	presents	the	results	of	equation	(4)	on	three	other	pre-trial	outcomes:	probability	to	
be	judged	through	an	accelerated	procedure	(column	2);	probability	to	experience	pre-trial	
detention	 (column	 3);	 number	 of	 days	 under	 pre-trial	 detention	 (column	 4).	 Prosecutor’s	
gender	 does	 affect	 women’s	 probability	 to	 be	 convicted	 after	 accelerated	 procedure	 but	
does	not	affect	pre-trial	detention.	A	one-standard-deviation	increase	in	the	share	of	women	
among	 prosecutor	 decreases	 the	 proportion	 of	 accelerated	 procedures	 for	 women	 by	
roughly	0.5%.	
	
Results	 on	 sentences	 are	 presented	 in	 the	 last	 three	 columns	 of	 table	 5.	 The	 sex	 of	 the	
prosecutors	does	not	seem	to	affect	the	gender	gaps	in	sentences.	The	point	estimates	are	
both	small	and	non-significant.	Only	suspended	prison	seems	to	be	slightly	affected:	quanta	
increase	for	women	when	there	are	more	prosecutors	who	are	female.	
	
All	 in	 all,	 the	 sex	 of	 the	 prosecutor	 does	 not	 seem	 to	 affect	 the	 gender	 gap	 observed	 in	
criminal	 justice.	 This	 could	 be	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 main	 discretionary	 power	 of	 the	
prosecutor	is	to	decide	if	the	person	should	be	sued	or	not	and	which	charges	should	be	hold.	
Those	 decisions	 are	 hard	 to	 study	 with	 the	 database	 used	 in	 this	 article	 –	 even	 if	 some	
evidence	 goes	 against	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 an	 impact	 of	 prosecutor’s	 gender.	 However,	 it	 is	
interesting	 to	 know	 that	 the	 gender	 gap	 in	 sentences	 conditional	 on	 charges	 is	 almost	
unaffected	by	the	prosecutor’s	sex.	
	
	
	 18	
	 6.	Conclusion	
	
This	paper	documents	the	gender	gap	in	criminal	justice.	It	uses	three	different	strategies	to	
tackle	this	question:	simple	regression	with	extensive	control	variables;	within	criminal	
group	differences;	and	the	effect	of	courts’	gender	compositions	on	the	gender	gap.	The	
main	result	is	that	criminal	justice	is	one	of	the	rare	social	areas	in	which	gender	disparities	
advantage	women.	They	tend	to	be	sentenced	to	prison	far	less	than	men	are	and,	when	
women	are	sentenced,	the	sentences	are	for	shorter	periods	of	time.	Even	when	they	belong	
to	a	criminal	group	composed	of	different	sexes,	women	tend	to	be	less	severely	punished	
than	their	male	counterparts.	This	gender	gap	is	less	significant	when	judges	are	female.	This	
last	result	confirms	that	the	differences	observed	before	are	not	due	to	unobserved	
heterogeneity	not	absorbed	by	control	variables	or	group-fixed	effects.	If	this	were	the	case,	
judges’	sex	should	not	affect	the	gender	gap.	The	prosecutor’s	gender	does	not	affect	the	
sentencing	of	men	and	women.									
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Figure	1:	sentence	distribution	within	group.		
Man	 and	 woman	 have	 equal	 prison	 sentences	 in	 74%	 of	 the	 groups.	 Man	 has	 higher	
sentences	in	22%	of	the	cases,	woman	in	4%	of	the	cases.		
	
	
	
	
Figure	2:	sentence	distribution	within	group.		
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(a)	
	
	
(b)	
	
Figure	 3:	 sentences	 distribution	when	 the	woman	 is	 convicted	 to	more	 offenses	 than	 the	
man	(a)	or	when	the	woman	is	convicted	to	fewer	offenses	than	the	man	(b).		
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(a)	
	
	
(b)	
	
Figure	4:	sentences	distribution	when	the	woman	has	a	longer	criminal	record	than	the	man	
(a)	or	when	the	woman	has	a	shorter	criminal	record	than	the	man	(b).			 	
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		 All	 Mixed	duos	
	 Women	 Men	 Women	 Men	
		 Mean	 Sd	 Mean	 Sd	 Mean	 Sd	 Mean	 Sd	
Age	 35.5	 12.1	 33.1	 12	 29.6	 10	 30.6	 9.9	
French	 .89	 .31	 .86	 .34	 .77	 .42	 .74	 .44	
Past	conviction	 .17	 .37	 .32	 .47	 .21	 .41	 .35	 .48	
Crime	type	
Robbery	 .37	 .48	 .27	 .44	 .65	 .48	 .65	 .48	
Road	 .25	 .43	 .37	 .48	 0	 0	 0	 0	
Economy	 .08	 .27	 .04	 .19	 .02	 .12	 .02	 .12	
Violence	 .15	 .36	 .16	 .37	 .15	 .36	 .15	 .36	
Drug	 .04	 .19	 .06	 .24	 .15	 .35	 .15	 .35	
Insult	 .06	 .24	 .05	 .23	 .04	 .19	 .04	 .19	
Could	be	punished	by	a	maximum	of…	
1	year	 .14	 .35	 .13	 .34	 .02	 .14	 .02	 .14	
2	year	 .23	 .42	 .33	 .47	 .02	 .13	 .02	 .13	
3	year	 .32	 .47	 .22	 .41	 .11	 .32	 .11	 .32	
5	year	 .21	 .41	 .19	 .39	 .66	 .47	 .66	 .47	
more	than	5	years	 .1	 .3	 .13	 .34	 .19	 .39	 .19	 .39	
Pre-trial	detention	 .04	 .19	 .07	 .26	 .09	 .29	 .12	 .32	
Investigation	length	
(days)	 404	 573	 284	 465	 299	 468	 299	 468	
Accelerated	procedure	 .03	 .18	 .07	 .25	 .07	 .26	 .07	 .26	
Nb	of	conviction	 1.47	 .94	 1.54	 1.01	 1.7	 1.35	 1.73	 1.39	
Sentences	
Prison	(quantum)	 19	 100.9	 47.4	 163	 57.5	 218.6	 102.2	 309.9	
Probation	(quantum)	 25.9	 88.6	 29.9	 89.9	 26.2	 91.1	 30.4	 97.2	
Suspended	prison	
(quantum)	 36.6	 82.3	 28.2	 71.2	 53.2	 110	 39.7	 93.4	
Prison	(probability)	 .11	 .31	 .24	 .43	 .2	 .4	 .33	 .47	
Probation	(probability	 .15	 .36	 .18	 .38	 .13	 .33	 .14	 .35	
Suspended	prison	
(probability)	 .38	 .49	 .31	 .46	 .48	 .5	 .36	 .48	
N	 127065	 		 1267883	 		 2382	 		 2382	 		
		
Table	1	:	Descriptive	statistics,	convicted	offenders	2000-2003.		
The	first	part	presents	the	socio-demographic	characteristics	of	the	offenders	while	the	
second	one	present	the	type	of	crimes.	The	third	part	gives	the	longest	prison	sentences	that	
could	be	pronounced	against	offenders.	This	variable	is	a	proxy	for	crime	severity	as	defined	
in	the	criminal	code.	Parts	four	and	five	describe	the	procedural	characteristics	of	the	cases	
and	part	six	gives	information	on	sentences.	
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		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
	 Prison	 Probation	
Suspended	
prison	 Prison	 Probation	
Suspended	
prison	
	 Quantum	 Quantum	 Quantum	 Dummy	 Dummy	 Dummy	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Woman	 -37.93***	 -3.114*	 10.44***	 -0.0954***	 -0.00715	 0.0739***	
	
(4.212)	 (1.800)	 (1.964)	 (0.00828)	 (0.00704)	 (0.00931)	
	 	 	 	
		
	 	Control	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
	 	 	 	
		
	 	Obs	 4,762	 4,762	 4,762	 4,762	 4,762	 4,762	
Mean	
sample	 79.88	 28.28	 46.47	 0.266	 0.135	 0.421	
Sd	sample	 269.1	 94.24	 102.3	 0.442	 0.342	 0.494	
	
Table	2:	Effect	of	gender	on	sentences	among	mixed	groups.	
Woman	is	a	dummy	equal	to	one	if	the	defendant	is	a	woman.	Controls	include:	group	fixed	
effects,	nationality,	age,	age	square,	criminal	record,	number	of	convictions.	
	
	
	
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
	
Woman	more	convicted	than	man	
Woman	with	longer	criminal	career	than	
man	
	
Prison	
(quantum)	
Probation	
(quantum)	
Suspended	
prison	
(quantum)	
Prison	
(quantum)	
Probation	
(quantum)	
Suspended	
prison	
(quantum)	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Woman	 -99.00***	 -7.348	 34.32***	 -2.438	 2.287	 -9.276**	
	
(28.58)	 (11.28)	 (11.96)	 (5.757)	 (4.555)	 (4.647)	
	
		
	
		
	 	 	Control	
variables	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
	
		
	
		
	 	 	Observations	 272	 272	 272	 510	 510	 510	
Mean	sample	 133.6	 47.98	 54.32	 73.46	 32.38	 33.56	
Sd	sample	 400.5	 114.1	 105.8	 198.6	 85.25	 79.10		
Table	3:	Effect	of	gender	on	sentences	among	different	subtypes	of	mixed	groups.	
Woman	is	a	dummy	equal	to	one	if	the	defendant	is	a	woman.	Controls	include:	group	fixed	
effects,	 nationality,	 age,	 age	 square,	 criminal	 record	 (only	 in	 column	 1	 to	 3),	 number	 of	
convictions	(only	in	columns	4	to	6).	
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		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
	 Prison	 Probation	
Suspended	
prison	 Prison	 Probation	
Suspended	
prison	
	 Quantum	 Quantum	 Quantum	 Dummy	 Dummy	 Dummy	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Prop	women	judge	 3.521	 -2.485	 0.316	 0.0106	 0.00279	 0.00726	
	
(3.349)	 (3.649)	 (2.488)	 (0.0121)	 (0.0191)	 (0.0267)	
Woman	*	Prop	
women	judge	
8.103**	 9.291***	 -8.717**	 0.0149	 0.0127	 -0.0534**	
(4.066)	 (3.197)	 (3.374)	 (0.0123)	 (0.0163)	 (0.0233)	
	 	 	 	
		
	 	Control	variables	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
	 	 	 	
		
	 	Observations	 709,717	 709,717	 709,717	 709,717	 709,717	 709,717	
Mean	sample	 44.35	 28.97	 30	 0.225	 0.172	 0.324	
Sd	sample	 160.8	 88.90	 73.40	 0.418	 0.377	 0.468	
	
Table	4:	Effect	of	judges’	gender	composition	on	gender	gap.		
Woman	 is	 a	 dummy	equal	 to	 one	 if	 the	defendant	 is	 a	woman.	Prop	women	 judge	 is	 the	
proportion	 of	 women	 among	 judges	 (between	 0	 and	 1).	 Control	 variables	 are:	
courts*offender’s	sex	fixed	effects,	year,	month,	crime,	age,	nationality,	criminal	record.					
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	
	
Longest	
possible	
sentence	
Accelerated	
procedure	
Pre-trial	
detention	
Time	in	pre-
trial	
detention	
Prison	 Probation	 Suspended	prison	
	
Day	 Dummy	 Dummy	 Day	 Quantum	 Quantum	 Quantum	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Prop	women	
prosecutor	
-9.652	 0.00287	 0.00310	 0.580	 -0.744	 1.898	 -2.158	
(15.04)	 (0.00786)	 (0.00540)	 (0.710)	 (2.115)	 (2.766)	 (1.723)	
Woman	*	Prop	
women	prosecutor	
-2.807	 -0.0205**	 5.05e-05	 -1.226	 -1.655	 1.945	 4.992**	
(22.23)	 (0.00899)	 (0.00538)	 (0.923)	 (2.430)	 (2.446)	 (2.288)	
	 	 	 	
		
	 	 	Control	variables	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
	 	 	 	
		
	 	 	Observations	 729,285	 729,976	 729,976	 729,976	 729,976	 729,976	 729,976	
Mean	 1227	 0.0617	 0.0675	 7.311	 44.35	 28.97	 30	
Sd	 837.4	 0.241	 0.251	 49.94	 160.8	 88.90	 73.40	
	
Table	5:	Effect	of	prosecutors’	gender	composition	on	gender	gap.		
Woman	is	a	dummy	equal	to	one	if	the	defendant	is	a	woman.	Prop	women	prosecutor	is	the	
proportion	 of	 women	 among	 prosecutors	 (between	 0	 and	 1).	 Control	 variables	 are:	
courts*offender’s	sex	fixed	effects,	year,	month,	crime,	age,	nationality,	criminal	record.					 	
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Appendix	A	
	
Table	 A1	 presents	 the	 results	 of	 regressions	 of	 defendants’	 sex	 on	 different	 measure	 of	
sentences	after	controlling	for	the	observables.	Control	variables	include:	crime	type	(1395	
dummies),	place	(175	dummies),	time	(4	dummies	for	years,	12	for	months),	age,	age	square,	
past	 convictions,	nationality,	 type	of	procedure,	 criminal	 career.	 Infractions	 that	are	never	
sanctioned	 by	 prison,	 probation	 or	 suspended	 prison	 are	 dropped.	 In	 columns	 (1)	 to	 (3),	
offenders	 who	 were	 not	 convicted	 to	 prison	 (resp.	 probation,	 suspended	 prison),	 are	
considered	as	having	a	zero	day	sentence.	
Before	the	choice	of	a	sentence,	pre-trial	decision	could	also	be	affected	by	gender.	Some	
pre-trial	 decisions	 are	 registered	 in	 the	 database:	 severity	 of	 the	 charges,	 accelerated	
procedure,	 investigation	 length,	 pre-trial	 detention.	 The	 effect	 of	 defendants’	 gender	 on	
those	 variables	 is	 presented	 in	 table	 A2.	 The	 severity	 of	 the	 charges	 is	 captured	 by	 the	
longest	 possible	 sentence.	 As	 this	 is	 fully	 determined	 by	 the	 precise	 crime	 type,	 the	
regression	 presented	 in	 column	 (1)	 only	 includes	 control	 for	 large	 criminal	 categories	 (26	
dummies).	
Regressions	presented	in	table	A1	could	be	broken	down	by	subgroups,	especially	by	 large	
infraction	 categories.	 This	 is	 interesting	because	 crime	 controls	 are	more	or	 less	 stringent	
depending	on	 the	category.	 If,	 for	example,	 crime	severity	 could	vary	within	 the	“violence	
inducing	 sick	 leave	 shorter	 than	 8	 days”	 category,	 there	 is	 far	 less	 variation	 within	 the	
“driving	under	influence	category”.	Results	are	presented	in	table	A3.	
	
	
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
	 Prison	 Probation	
Suspended	
prison	 Prison	 Probation	
Suspended	
prison	
	 Quantum	 Quantum	 Quantum	 Dummy	 Dummy	 Dummy	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		
Woman	 -15.27***	 1.069***	 1.392***	 -0.0778***	 0.00573***	 0.0354***	
	
(0.875)	 (0.325)	 (0.347)	 (0.00194)	 (0.00154)	 (0.00266)	
	 	 	 	
		
	
		
Control	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
	 	 	 	
		
	
		
Constant	 -72.61***	 -8.855***	 28.79***	 -0.231***	 0.0410***	 0.538***	
	
(4.293)	 (1.921)	 (1.845)	 (0.00825)	 (0.0106)	 (0.0139)	
Obs	 1,389,766	 1,389,766	 1,389,766	 1,389,766	 1,389,766	 1,389,766	
	
Table	A1:	Effect	of	gender	on	sentences,	controlling	for	an	extensive	number	of	variables.	
Woman	is	a	dummy	equal	to	one	if	the	defendant	is	a	woman.	Controls	include:	crime	(1395	
dummies),	place	(175	dummies),	time	(4	dummies	for	years,	12	for	months),	age,	age	square,	
nationality,	 type	of	procedure,	criminal	career,	 investigation	 length,	accelerated	procedure	
(dummy),	number	of	convictions	and	time	in	custody	(if	any).	
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		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
	
Longest	
possible	
sentence	
Accelerated	
procedure	
Investigation	
length	
Time	in	pre-
trial	
detention	
		 		 		 		 		
Woman	 -60.52***	 -0.0130***	 24.16***	 -3.456***	
	
(3.230)	 (0.00227)	 (2.032)	 (0.278)	
	 	 	 	 	Control	 All	 All	 All	 All	
	 	 	 	 	Constant	 1,350***	 0.0549***	 -9.011	 -8.530***	
	
(16.39)	 (0.00472)	 (11.66)	 (0.672)	
Observations	 1,388,503	 1,389,766	 1,389,766	 1,389,766	
	
Table	A2:	Effect	of	gender	on	pre-trial	decisions.	
Woman	is	a	dummy	equal	to	one	if	the	defendant	is	a	woman.	Controls	include:	crime	(1395	
dummies)	or	crime	type	in	column	(1),	place	(175	dummies),	time	(4	dummies	for	years,	12	
for	months),	 age,	age	 square,	nationality,	 type	of	procedure,	 criminal	 career,	 investigation	
length	(except	in	columns	(3)	and	(4)),	accelerated	procedure	(except	in	columns	(3)	and	(4)),	
number	of	convictions	and	time	in	custody	(except	in	column	5).	
	
	
	
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	
		 Robbery	 Road	 Violence	 Drug	 Under	30	 Above	30	
Prison	 		 		 		 		 		
	Sex	 -22.87***	 -4.280***	 -17.06***	 -55.52***	 -14.71***	 -16.56***	
	
(0.996)	 (0.162)	 (1.274)	 (5.989)	 (1.017)	 (0.925)	
Probation	 		 		 		 		 		 		
Sex	 2.553***	 -0.780***	 -5.966***	 13.18***	 0.922*	 0.186	
		 (0.585)	 (0.294)	 (0.900)	 (3.169)	 (0.505)	 (0.393)	
Suspended	prison	 		
	 	
		
	 	Sex	 2.388***	 -2.410***	 -1.384*	 17.64***	 1.413***	 0.887**	
	
(0.502)	 (0.215)	 (0.818)	 (3.072)	 (0.449)	 (0.390)	
	
		
	 	
		
	 	Observations	 389,477	 496,435	 223,038	 80,731	 693,465	 696,301	
	
Table	A3:	Effect	of	gender	on	sentences	by	crime	and	age.	
Controls	 include:	crime	(1395	dummies),	place	(175	dummies),	 time	(4	dummies	for	years,	
12	for	months),	age,	age	square,	nationality,	type	of	procedure,	criminal	career,	investigation	
length	and	time	in	custody	(if	any).	
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Appendix	B:	additional	material	on	criminal	groups	
	
	
	
	
Figure	 B1:	 sentence	 distribution	 within	 non-mixed	 group	 when	 one	 offender	 has	 been	
convicted	to	more	crime	than	the	other.	
	
	
	
	
Figure	 B2:	 sentence	 distribution	within	 non-mixed	 group	when	 one	offender	 has	 a	 longer	
criminal	record	than	the	other.	
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Women	more	convicted	 Women	with	longer	criminal	career	
	 	
Women	 Men	 Women	 Men	
		 		 Mean	 Mean	 Mean	 Mean	
	
Age	 29.15	 30.11	 29.14	 30.58	
	
French	 .82	 .76	 .7	 .61	
		 Past	conviction	 .26	 .38	 1	 .26	
	
Investigation	length	 296.76	 296.76	 238.76	 238.76	
		 Pre-trial	detention	 .15	 .13	 .11	 .13	
Type	of	crime	
Robbery	 .5	 .5	 .77	 .77	
Violence	 .19	 .19	 .1	 .1	
Drug	 .21	 .21	 .1	 .1	
		 Nb	of	conviction	 3.07	 1.76	 1.51	 1.49	
Sentence	
Prison	(quantum)	 98.16	 169.03	 72.03	 74.88	
Probation	(quantum)	 43.9	 52.06	 34.41	 30.35	
Suspended	prison	(quantum)	 72.57	 36.07	 28.06	 39.06	
Prison	(probability)	 .29	 .41	 .4	 .34	
Probation	(probability	 .24	 .23	 .21	 .15	
Suspended	prison	(probability)	 .45	 .38	 .27	 .4	
		 N	 136	 136	 255	 255	
	
Table	 B1:	 descriptive	 statistics,	 offenders	 in	 mixed	 groups	 in	 which	 women	 are	 more	
convicted	(columns	1	for	women,	2	for	men)	or	women	have	longer	criminal	career	(columns	
3	for	women	and	4	for	men).	 	
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Appendix	C	
	
	
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
	
Sex=woman	 Age	 French	 Investigation	length	
Accelerated	
procedure	
Pre-trial	
detention	
(day)	
Past	
convition	
Nb	
convictions	
		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		 		
%	women	
judge	 -0.00646*	 -0.467	 -0.0561***	 54.55***	 0.0311***	 3.787***	 0.0201**	 0.0462*	
	
(0.00360)	 (0.336)	 (0.0149)	 (17.45)	 (0.00796)	 (0.869)	 (0.0101)	 (0.0236)	
Year=2003	 -0.000312	 -0.0449	 -0.00464**	 -1.169	 0.00760***	 0.194	 -0.00127	 0.0313***	
	
(0.000529)	 (0.0494)	 (0.00219)	 (2.568)	 (0.00117)	 (0.128)	 (0.00149)	 (0.00347)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Observations	 335	 335	 335	 335	 335	 335	 335	 335	
Mean	 0.0954	 33.70	 0.904	 274.5	 0.0401	 5.568	 0.289	 1.506	
Sd	 0.0145	 1.342	 0.0617	 70.90	 0.0343	 3.586	 0.0408	 0.106	
	
Table	 C1:	 correlation	 between	 proportion	 of	 women	 among	 judges	 and	 observable	
characteristics	of	the	offenders.	
	
	
	
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)	 (7)	 (8)	
	
Difference	between	2003	and	2000	in…	
		
Sex=woman	 Age	 French	 Investigation	length	
Accelerated	
procedure	
Pre-trial	
detention	
(day)	
Past	
convition	
Nb	
convictions	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Diff	%	women	
judge		 -0.00104	 0.548*	 0.00715	 -13.89	 0.00912	 -0.187	 -0.00493	 -0.0346	
between	2000	
2003	 (0.00510)	 (0.308)	 (0.00751)	 (19.25)	 (0.00924)	 (0.960)	 (0.0114)	 (0.0310)	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	Obs	 161	 161	 161	 161	 161	 161	 161	 161	
Mean	sample	 -0.000391	 -0.127	 -0.0131	 -1.852	 0.0208	 0.606	 -0.00527	 0.0932	
Sd	sample	 0.0154	 0.949	 0.0227	 55.20	 0.0281	 2.896	 0.0333	 0.0927	
	
Table	 C2:	 correlation	 between	 change	 in	 the	 proportion	 of	 women	 among	 judges	 and	
changes	in	observable	characteristics	of	the	offenders.	
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Appendix	D				 		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	 (5)	 (6)			 		 Robbery	 Road	 Violence	 Drug	 Under	30	 Above	30		 	 		 	 	 		 	 		 Prop	women	judge	 1.249	 0.268	 1.358	 44.86*	 3.400	 4.610	Prison	 	 (5.923)	 (1.411)	 (6.341)	 (24.72)	 (3.868)	 (3.485)		 Woman	*	Prop	women	judge	 6.152	 1.797	 24.49*	 -6.390	 12.77**	 2.058			 (7.708)	 (2.068)	 (12.61)	 (64.17)	 (6.152)	 (4.848)		 Prop	women	judge	 -5.542	 -1.426	 -2.902	 3.128	 -1.993	 -2.985	Probation	 	 (5.547)	 (2.901)	 (6.906)	 (12.62)	 (4.269)	 (3.622)		 Woman	*	Prop	women	judge	 9.689*	 6.892**	 23.85**	 16.60	 6.719	 11.64**			 (5.425)	 (3.244)	 (11.88)	 (36.90)	 (4.733)	 (4.567)			 Prop	women	judge	 1.185	 1.574	 -1.896	 -1.596	 0.0373	 0.461	Suspended	 		 (3.001)	 (2.959)	 (5.383)	 (12.20)	 (2.882)	 (2.842)	prison	 Woman	*	Prop	women	judge	 -16.10**	 0.254	 -15.84*	 2.745	 -16.34***	 -4.088		 (7.019)	 (2.500)	 (8.925)	 (39.77)	 (5.525)	 (4.323)		 		 	 	 	 		 	 	N	Obs	 		 205,083	 248,015	 115,142	 42,565	 356,178	 353,539	Mean	prison	term	 61.93	 9.007	 58.23	 145.5	 46.61	 42.07	Sd	prison	term	 159.1	 38.51	 194.7	 369.1	 146.4	 174.1		
Table	D1:	Effect	of	judges’	gender	composition	on	gender	gap	depending	on	crime	type	or	
age.	Control	for	courts*offender’s	sex	fixed	effects,	year,	month,	crime,	age,	nationality,	
criminal	record.		
